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Abstract
Mental contents come to mind more or less easily depending on their ￿ accessibility￿(Higgins, 1996).
We consider how the pattern of learning is a⁄ected by the framing of feedback about opponents￿
play when subjects are engaged in several interactions. Speci￿cally, we examine a setting where the
feedback about opponents￿play made available to subjects along the learning process is identical
across two treatments, but the presentation di⁄ers to make it accessible game by game in one
treatment but not in the other. Behavior di⁄ers strongly between the two treatments and we
show that the di⁄erence in behaviors can be explained by using the concept of analogy-based
expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005). Two further experimental treatments were designed to
examine behavior when information is restricted to match the theoretical mental representations,
and behavior in these treatments strongly con￿rms the hypothesis. More generally, the experiment
suggests the need to incorporate framing considerations into equilibrium analysis.
Keywords: Analogy-based expectation; information processing; accessibility; interactive
learning.
JEL Classification: C72; D82.
1 Introduction
Information comes to mind more or less easily depending on its accessibility (Higgins, 1996). For the
sake of illustration, consider Figures 1a and 1b.1 As we look at the object of Figure 1a, we have an
immediate impression of the height of the tower, but not of the total area that its building blocks
would cover if the tower were dismantled (the total area can be estimated by a deliberate procedure,
such as multiplying the base area of a block by the number of blocks, but, admittedly, it is less
immediately accessible). The situation is reversed in Figure 1b in which the total area is immediately
accessible, but the height of the tower that could be constructed with these building blocks is not.
The accessibility dimension of information may have important implications for the understanding
of how information is being processed in a variety of applications. In this paper, we consider the




1This example is taken from Kahneman (2003).
1Figure 1a Figure 1b
try to learn the behaviors of other players in various games so as to make the best choice of strategy in
each game. Our main insight concerns the comparison of play in two treatments of the experiment in
which the same objective feedback about opponents￿past play is given to subjects￿ but with various
degrees of accessibility. Subjects play two di⁄erent games about which they only know the structure
of their own payo⁄s. In each round and prior to the action choice, it is announced whether subjects
play game A or game B. In addition, subjects receive some information about the past play of their
opponents in both games. In principle, the information is precise in that it details past play for
both games separately. However, as it turns out the precise information is relatively accessible in
the ￿rst treatment but not in the second. As a consequence, subjects in the second treatment use
the precise information as if it were much coarser. In addition, we run two control treatments, one
where accessibility is not an issue because the information is precisely spelled out for subjects and
one where the information is exogenously coarse. We observe that the di⁄erence in accessibility yields
very di⁄erent patterns of behaviors even after 60 rounds of play.
We will explain the di⁄erence of behaviors in the two treatments by relying on the recent approach
of analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005). This approach relaxes the traditional Nash
equilibrium concept by assuming that players may have a partial rather than total understanding
of their opponents￿strategies, and it parameterizes players by how precisely they understand the
strategy of their opponents. Speci￿cally, players bundle situations or games into analogy classes, and
they form expectations only about the aggregate behavior in each analogy class. Players are assumed
to best-respond against these beliefs and, in equilibrium, these beliefs coincide with the aggregate
play in each class. In general, the equilibrium that is so obtained is sensitive to the analogy partitions
used by the players. The analogy-based expectation equilibrium is viewed as the limiting outcome of
a learning process in which players would only keep track of the aggregate statistics of the opponents￿
average play in each analogy class; it is not viewed as the result of introspective reasoning (see Jehiel
2005).
In our experiment, there were two underlying normal form games A and B, both involving a
Column Player and a Row player. In both A and B, the Row player had to choose between three
2rows ￿;￿; or ￿, and the Column player had to choose between ￿ve columns a;b;c;d; or e. There were
a priori two possible analogy grouping for each player: the ￿ne analogy grouping (the two games are
treated separately) and the coarse analogy grouping (the two games are bundled into one class).
We have conducted several experiments in which subjects were assigned either to the role of the
Row player or to the role of the Column player for the entire experiment. Each subject played an
equal number of games A and B over 60 rounds. Subjects were informed of the action space structure
of the two players and of their own payo⁄structure, but not of the payo⁄structure of their opponent.2
In each round, subjects of each population of players were randomly matched to subjects of the other
population. The various treatments di⁄ered in the feedback given to subjects after each round of the
experiment. In all cases, the feedback was about the past play of the subjects assigned to the role
of the other player in the last ￿ve rounds. Note that subjects received no feedback about their own
performance until the end of the experiment at which time they were informed how much they had
earned over the 60 rounds.
Intuitively, when in the experiment players have access to the behavior of their opponents game
by game this corresponds to the ￿ne analogy grouping and when they have access to the aggregate
behavior only this corresponds to the coarse analogy grouping. In all treatments, Column players had
access to the behaviors of Row players game by game. Speci￿cally, as a Column player was to play
game ! = A or B he or she was being informed of the distribution of play of Row players (in the entire
population) over the last ￿ve rounds in game !. So the corresponding analogy grouping of Column
players was always the ￿ne grouping.
Treatments di⁄ered in the accessibility dimension of the feedback given to Row players. In the
￿rst benchmark treatment, Fine, Row players received feedback about Column players￿past behavior
in the same way as Column players. In the second benchmark treatment, Coarse, they only received
aggregate feedback, that is, they were told how often Column players had chosen each of the two
actions in both games without being told how the behavior was distributed between game A and B.
In addition, we have two treatments, our main treatments, where, in principle, the (relevant)
information provided is identical as in treatment Fine but not quite as immediately accessible.3 In
treatment FineAccess, this feedback was given in a matrix form as depicted in Figure 2 (where the
letter inside a square indicates the game and the color of the square indicates the action played by the
Column player in that speci￿c interaction￿ actions appeared as colors also when playing the game;
grey squares indicate that not enough rounds had yet been played to ￿ll the grid).
In treatment CoarseAccess, the feedback was given in two consecutive screens, depicted in
Figures 3a and 3b where the ￿rst screen informed subjects about the distribution of actions (in
color form) that had been played in the last ￿ve rounds and the second screen gives a string of
letters indicating the games in which these actions had been taken. It is worth emphasizing that, even
2We adopted this framework so as to make introspective reasoning about how to play the game inaccessible. This also
avoided the di¢ culty pointed out by Ehrblatt et al. (2005) that the belief formation may be a⁄ected by the knowledge
of the opponent￿ s payo⁄.
3Admittedly, in treatment Fine, row players received only information about the past play in the game they were
playing unlike in treatment FineAccess and CoarseAccess but as this is the only relevant information we don￿ t
consider the information to be practically di⁄erent.
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though the two screens appeared in di⁄erent formats, subjects were informed about the correspondence
between the two4. Thus, feedback in the two treatments was objectively the same (and the same as
in treatment Fine), even though accessibility was not (the distribution of play in each game A and
B was obviously made more accessible in FineAccess than in CoarseAccess).
The payo⁄s in games A and B were chosen so that the prediction of the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium approach is markedly di⁄erent depending on whether the Row player uses the ￿ne or the
coarse analogy grouping (assuming the Column player uses the ￿ne analogy grouping)￿ with a unique
equilibrium employing pure strategies in each case (see Section 2). In regard of the analogy-based
expectation approach, we ask three questions:
Question 1 Do the observed distributions of play in treatments FineAccess and CoarseAccess
stabilize?
Question 2 Do the long run behaviors in FineAccess and CoarseAccess correspond to the be-
haviors in Fine and Coarse, respectively?
Question 3 Do the long run behaviors in Fine and FineAccess on the one hand, and Coarse
and CoarseAccess on the other correspond to the prediction of the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium approach?
4The order is as follows: the ￿rst element of the string is the top left box of the colored grid and the sequence
continues down the ￿rst column, then the second etc, until the last element which corresponds to the bottom right box
in the colored grid. The instruction sheet handed out to explain this is included in the appendix. Note also that
￿gures 2 and 3 show the same information.
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With the required caveats, we obtained positive answers to all three questions. The behavior
does stabilize; treatments Fine and FineAccess are similar to each other and so are Coarse and
CoarseAccess;5 and all observations are remarkably well organized by the theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe more formally the
analogy-based expectation approach and we apply it to the environment considered in our experiment.
In Section 3 we present more precisely the experimental design. In Section 4 we present the results
of the experiments. Section 5 puts this work in a broader perspective stressing the importance of
incorporating framing considerations into equilibrium analysis.
2 Background and Theory
Consider a family of normal form games denoted by ! 2 ￿. Each game has two players i and j. For
each !, the action space of player i is Ai and the action space of player j is Aj. Action spaces Ai and
Aj are ￿nite. The payo⁄ obtained by player i in game ! when (ai;aj) 2 Ai ￿ Aj is played is denoted
by ui(ai;aj;!). The probability of game ! is denoted by p(!). We assume that each player i knows
5Speci￿cally, we compared Fine and FineAccess in terms of the frequency with which Row players played best-
responses to the distribution of actions game by game as resulting from the feedback they received. Similarly, we
compared Coarse and CoarseAccess in terms of the frequency with which Row players played best-responses to
the aggregate distribution of actions over A and B as resulting from the feedback they received. We did the same
comparisons in terms of the distribution of the payo⁄ losses vis a vis these two theories.
5which game ! 2 ￿ he is playing.
A strategy of player i is a mapping ￿i : ￿ ! ￿Ai where ￿i(ai j !) denotes the probability with
which action ai 2 Ai is chosen by player i in game !.
Each player i is endowed with an analogy partition Ai over ￿. The element of Ai containing !
is denoted by ￿i(!) and called the analogy class of player i at !. Player i is assumed to understand
only the aggregate behavior of player j in every analogy class in Ai. Formally, given the strategy
￿j of player j, the strategy of player j perceived by player i (given Ai) is de￿ned by the function
￿j : ￿ ! ￿Aj such that for all ! 2 ￿ and aj 2 Aj








p(!0 j ￿i(!))￿j(aj j !0) (1)
That is, given the strategy ￿j of player j, player i perceives only the average behavior of player j in
each analogy class where the weight assigned to a speci￿c game !0 of an analogy class is proportional
to p(!0).
De￿nition A strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;￿2) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (ABEE) given
the analogy partitions A1, A2 if for all i, ! 2 ￿ and a￿
i 2 Supp[￿i(!)]:
a￿





where ￿j(aj j !) is given by (1).
In other words, in equilibrium each player i plays a best-response to the belief that player j behaves
in each game ! according to the aggregate behavior in ￿i(!), i.e. ￿j.
Jehiel (2005) (see also Jehiel and Koessler, 2006) motivates the analogy-based expectation approach
by a learning story. More precisely, Jehiel (2005) interprets the ABEE as the limiting outcome of a
learning process in which each player i would base his strategy on the sole feedback about the aggregate
play of player j in the various analogy classes of Ai . One of the objectives of this paper is to test
that view.
In our experiment, we considered two games ! = A and B whose payo⁄ matrices for the Row
(i = 1) and Column player (i = 2) are depicted in the following tables:
A a b c d e B a b c d e
￿ 25,10 0,10 10,20 0,0 0,0 ￿ 15,0 20,10 10,0 5,5 0,0
￿ 20,15 15,0 5,0 10,0 0,0 ￿ 0,10 25,10 0,0 10,20 0,0
￿ 15,0 10,0 0,0 5,25 25,0 ￿ 10,0 15,0 5,25 0,0 25,0
The two games A and B were played with the same frequency so that p(A) = p(B) = 1
2. Given
the feedback given to Column player (to be described more precisely in the next Section), the relevant
analogy partition for Column player was the ￿ne partition A
f
2 = ffAg;fBgg. For the Row player,
6two analogy partitions can be considered: either the ￿ne partition, A
f
1 = ffAg;fBgg, or the coarse
partition, Ac
1 = ffA;Bgg.
When the Row player￿ s analogy partition is ￿ne:
When both players use the ￿ne analogy partition, ABEE coincides with Nash equilibrium. In game
A the only Nash equilibrium requires that the Row player plays ￿, ￿1(A) = ￿, and the Column player
plays c, ￿2(A) = c. In game B the only Nash equilibrium requires that the Row player plays ￿,
￿1(B) = ￿, and the Column player plays d, ￿2(B) = d. This is easily seen as the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies single out a unique pair of actions in each game.6
When the Row player￿analogy partition is coarse:
When A1 = Ac
1 and A2 = A
f
2, the only (analogy-based expectation) equilibrium is (￿1;￿2) where
￿1(A) = ￿, ￿1(B) = ￿ and ￿2(A) = a, ￿2(B) = b. That is, the Row player plays ￿ in game A and ￿
in game B; the Column player plays a in game A and b in game B. Thus, the strategies are markedly
di⁄erent from the Nash equilibrium strategies.
It is easy to understand why this strategy pro￿le de￿nes an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
The Column player plays a in A because this is the best-response to ￿; she plays b in B because this
is the best-response to ￿. The aggregate behavior of the Column player is a balanced mix of a
and b (remember that p(A) = p(B) = 1
2). Thus, ￿2(a j !) = ￿2(b j !) = 1
2 for ! = A and B.
Given the expectation that the Column player plays a and b with an equal frequency, the Row player
￿nds it optimal to play ￿ in game A (because 20+15
2 >
max(20+0;15+10)




2 ). It is a routine exercise to check that there is no other equilibrium in this
case.
3 Experimental Design
The experiments were computerized using Tomlinson￿ s (2005) Expecon software. They were conducted
at the University of London between February and December 2005. Upon arrival at the lab, subjects
sat down at a computer terminal to start the experiment. Experiment instructions were presented
on the computer screen and a written summary of the experiment instructions was also handed out.
At all times, subjects were invited to raise their hands to ask questions which would be answered
privately.
The experiment consisted of four treatments which varied in the accessibility of the information
available to subjects about the actions of others. Each session involved eight subjects and four sessions
were run for each treatment. In total 128 subjects participated in the experiment, drawn from the
student population at UCL. Their subjects of study included a cross section of arts, humanities, science
6In both games A and B action e is strictly dominated (by a mixture over a and d) for the Column player. After
eliminating action e action ￿ is strictly dominated for the Row player (by action ￿ in A and action ￿ in B). Following
these eliminations, in game A, actions d and b are strictly dominated by a and a mixture of a and c, respectively. In
game B, actions c and a are strictly dominated by b and a mixture of b and d, respectively. Finally, with the remaining
actions, ￿ in A and ￿ in B strictly dominate ￿ and ￿ respectively, and we can conclude.
7and medical subjects. Subjects were paid a turn-up fee of £5 and in addition to this were given £0.05
per point won during the experiment. The average payment was around £13 per subject, including
the turn-up fee. All of the sessions lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour, with the CoarseAccess
treatments taking the longest. And subjects took longer to consider their choices at the start of the
experiment: generally, over our sessions of 60 rounds, the ￿rst 20 rounds took a similar length of time
as the last 40 rounds.
In all treatments, subjects were split up equally into two roles, Row and Column. Each session
consisted of sixty rounds where Row and Column subjects were randomly matched into four pairs to
make a choice in one of two normal form games, the Row subject choosing the row in the game matrix
and the Column subject choosing the column. The two normal form games chosen were detailed in
section 2. In each round, two pairs were allocated to ￿situation A￿and two to ￿situation B￿ , and this
information was common knowledge to both subjects in each pair. Subjects could only see their own
payments in each situation, and were given information about the choices made by the subjects in
the other role in the previous ￿ve rounds, and the situations in which these choices were made. The
treatments di⁄ered only in how this feedback was presented to subjects with role Row.
In all treatments the Column subjects were presented in every round with the number of times
each row had been chosen, in the current situation, over the last ￿ve rounds. The number was shown
against the row on their payo⁄ matrix, and the experiment instructions explained the meaning of the
numbers and that they were being provided ￿to help you make your decision.￿Column subjects were
never given any feedback about play in the situation not currently seen. For example, if a Column
subject was in situation A in round 25, she only saw the distribution of choices for situation A on the
screen. In a later round, she may have been in situation B, and only feedback for situation B would
have been seen. Appendix A shows the instruction sheets handed out at the start of the experiment,
which also show screenshots from the experiment software.
The two main treatments, CoarseAccess and FineAccess were designed to examine how the
accessibility (or salience7) of feedback information a⁄ects how the information is used. In both
treatments Row subjects were given full information about the distribution of columns chosen in the
last ￿ve rounds, and the situations in which the choices were made. For the Row subjects, each
column was given a color, and these colors were used to indicate the choices. In the FineAccess
treatment, before seeing the current situation and being able to make a choice, each row player was
shown a screen containing a grid of squares. Each square was given the color of a previous choice,
and contained the letter of the situation it was made in. The ordering of this grid was randomized
independently each round, and subjects were informed of this. Row subjects were allowed to consider
this information for as long as they wanted, and then continue to the next screen to see the situation
to which they had been allocated and to make a choice. The choice screen contained no information
about previous choices￿ it was necessary for subjects to choose how to interpret the feedback grid
and remember what they thought relevant before going on to make a choice.
The CoarseAccess treatment made it harder to connect the situation to the choices. In this
7Higgins (1996) gives a good overview of the concepts of accessibility and salience.
8treatment, Row subjects were shown a similar grid of colored squares, but the situation letters in
each square were removed. They were presented on a following screen as a string of As and Bs.
The ￿rst letter corresponded to the top left in the grid, and it worked down each column in turn,
to the last letter giving the situation for the choice indicated in the bottom right of the grid. The
instruction sheet handed out at the start of the experiment gave a clear indication of this ordering.
Again, screenshots are included in Appendix A. Subjects were free to consider each screen for as long
as desired before continuing to the next, but could not go back once they had moved on. Clearly
now, although the same information is being presented, it is cognitively much more di¢ cult to create
two separate distributions of play for each situation. E⁄ectively, the whole grid of colored squares
needs to be remembered when connecting the distribution of moves to the situations. The situation
information is thus less accessible in the CoarseAccess treatment, even though the subjects are
presented with screens giving identical information content.8
The two control treatments Coarse and Fine were simpler. Here the Row subjects were given
similar information to the Column subjects. Every subject was told the number of times each choice
had been made by subjects in the other role, over the last ￿ve rounds. In the Fine treatment the
Row subjects saw this information just for the current situation, identically to the information given
to Column subjects. However, in the Coarse treatment the row players saw the total frequency of
each column choice aggregated over the two situations, and were not given any information about the
situation in which the choices were made.
These two treatments establish an obvious benchmark as accessibility is trivial in both cases. From
the viewpoint of ABEE these treatments correspond to di⁄erent exogenous analogy classes that are
directly induced. Thus, the prediction for the Fine treatment is given by ABEE with ￿ne analogy
classes (i.e. Nash equilibrium), while the prediction for Coarse corresponds to the ABEE with coarse
analogy classes (see section 2).
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate data
A ￿rst set of summary statistics is given in Table 1. They show for all four treatments the frequencies
of each choice in each of the two situations for row and column players. A ￿rst observation is
that there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence of behaviors across treatments. Second the modal behaviors of
Row players and Column players in Fine and Coarse coincide with the behaviors arising in the
Nash equilibrium and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with coarse grouping, respectively.
Third, the distributions of behaviors in Fine and FineAccess on the one hand and Coarse and
CoarseAccess on the other are similar, thereby con￿rming our intuition that the feedback about
opponents￿play is accessible game by game in FineAccess but only in aggregate over the two games
in CoarseAccess.
8This isn￿ t necessarily as di¢ cult as it sounds as, near equilibrium, only two colors would be seen, and would be
partitioned identically to the situations, making it much easier to match the two parts of the feedback.
9Row Player Situation A Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
￿ (Nash Equilibrium) 73% 80% 24% 24%
￿ (ABE equilibrium) 18% 19% 64% 66%
￿ (Level 1 reasoning) 9% 2% 12% 10%
Row Player Situation B Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
￿ (ABE Equilibrium) 16% 23% 62% 73%
￿ (Nash equilibrium) 76% 73% 21% 17%
￿ (Level 1 reasoning) 8% 4% 17% 10%
Col Player Situation A Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
a (ABE Equilibrium) 43% 33% 66% 75%
b 0% 1% 0% 0%
c (Nash equilibrium) 47% 60% 8% 12%
d 10% 5% 25% 13%
e 0% 0% 0% 0%
Col Player Situation B Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
a 0% 0% 0% 0%
b (ABE Equilibrium) 15% 29% 42% 51%
c 8% 7% 30% 16%
d (Nash equilibrium) 77% 64% 28% 33%
e 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 1: Summary of choices made
Observe that there are still some systematic deviations from equilibrium play, such as column
players choosing a in situation A in the Fine and FineAccess treatments. However, in all cases
these deviations are the same between the Fine and FineAccess treatments and the Coarse and
CoarseAccess treatments.
The results, in particular the comparative statics, appear to be very encouraging for the theoretical
model. In particular, the table suggests that the answer to Question 2 is yes. Behavior in FineAccess
appears to be very similar to behavior in Fine and behavior in CoarseAccess very similar to behavior
in Coarse. There is also some support for an a¢ rmative answer to Question 3. The theoretical
predictions are modal (though not met all the time).
The key question is, of course, whether the aggregate frequencies are coincidental or can be traced
to individual behavior. In order to investigate this question we examine whether individual decisions
are best responses to the information provided. Of course, in doing so we shall distinguish between
￿ne and coarse information, taking into account that in some instances best replies to both types of
information may coincide. We consider three di⁄erent beliefs that the row players might hold about
the strategy of the column players. The ￿rst two are constructed from the empirical distributions
of past play over the previous 5 rounds. The Fine beliefs use the ￿ne feedback, thereby considering
only previous play of the Column players for the situation observed by the row player. The Coarse
beliefs use the Coarse feedback, e.g. the total frequencies of past play of the Column players over both
situations. To these beliefs we add a third, the Uniform beliefs, which assumes a uniform strategy of
the column players. This can be interpreted as the row players ignoring the feedback and taking the
row with the highest average payo⁄. The Uniform beliefs correspond to the ￿Level 1￿reasoning of
10Row
None Uniform Coarse Fine Coarse & Fine9
Fine 5% 8% 17% 76% 7%
FineAccess 2% 3% 21% 80% 6%
CoarseAccess 8% 15% 60% 43% 26%
Coarse 5% 10% 68% 28% 11%
Column
None Uniform Fine Uniform & Fine10
Fine 9% 69% 68% 46%
FineAccess 13% 55% 71% 38%
CoarseAccess 11% 75% 62% 48%
Coarse 11% 68% 66% 45%
Table 2: Best response frequencies
Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), with Level 0 meaning a uniform strategy. Higher level beliefs in this
model would require knowledge of the payo⁄s of the opponent, which are not available to subjects. So
we don￿ t consider them here. Having constructed these beliefs from the information made available
to row players we are able to calculate the expected pro￿t for choosing each row. Table 2 details
the frequencies of best responses for each method of forming beliefs and also shows the best response
frequency for column players to the Fine and Uniform beliefs which are constructed similarly to those
for the row players.
The table is very suggestive. In fact, the table lends even stronger support to our theoretical
reasoning than the previous table that summarized outcomes. Both, in Fine and FineAccess row
subjects best respond to ￿ne information around 80% of the time while in Coarse and CoarseAccess
row subjects best respond to coarse information around 65% of the time. It is maybe not surprising
that the numbers for the coarse treatments are lower than those for the ￿ne treatments, since after
all ￿ne information is more reliable than coarse information. Moreover, the number is lowest in
CoarseAccess, which may be attributed to the fact that in this treatment even accessing the coarse
information requires some substantial cognitive e⁄ort and is much harder than in the case where the
coarse information is simply given exogenously.
Column players receive only the Fine feedback in all treatments, and through the same screens.
It is still interesting to observe that the distribution of best-responses to the Uniform beliefs and the
Fine beliefs are very similar in all treatments in which di⁄erent behaviors were observed. Speci￿cally,
Column players best respond to the Fine feedback between 62% and 71% of the time. However,
following the Uniform beliefs also seems popular to them. This could be understood as a response to
varying risk attitudes amongst the column players. Notably, in the FineAccess treatment where the
fewest number of row players deviate from best-responding to the Fine beliefs, we see the highest level
of column players following the Fine beliefs as well. For now, though, it is enough that we note that
the variation between treatments comes mostly from the choices of beliefs of the row players, that is,
the Fine beliefs in treatments Fine and FineAccess and the Coarse belief in treatments Coarse
and CoarseAccess.
11In a further test of the similarity or di⁄erence between the treatments we consider directly the
distribution of expected losses with respect to the ￿ne and coarse models of opponents￿play. We
calculated the theoretical expected losses for the choices taken, if the row players were to treat the
two kinds of feedback as the true distribution of column play. Figure 4 shows a histogram giving
the empirical distribution of expected losses of the choices made by the Row players, when using the
Fine beliefs, i.e the past distribution of Column players￿actions in the current situation. It shows a
clear similarity between the Fine and FineAccess treatments on the one hand, and the Coarse and
CoarseAccess treatments on the other. The next graph, Figure 5 shows the expected loss of the
choice taken when using the Coarse beliefs, i.e. the past distribution of Column players￿actions over
both situations A and B. Again, this clearly shows the similarity between the Fine and FineAccess
treatments on the one hand, and the Coarse and CoarseAccess treatments on the other. Finally,
Figure 6 shows the distribution of expected losses generated from the uniform beliefs.
Figure 4: Expected loss using the Fine beliefs
The results strongly support the hypothesis that the accessibility of the information determines
how the information is used when making decisions. The FineAccess treatment shows that when the
situation information is made accessible, it is used and a separate distribution of opponents￿actions
is considered for each situation, similar to that shown in the Fine treatment. The Coarse Access
treatment makes the situation information considerably less accessible and thus subjects behave very
similarly to the Coarse control treatment where the situation information is deliberately removed.
12Figure 5: Expected loss using the Coarse beliefs
Figure 6: Expected loss using the Uniform beliefs
134.2 Individual data
Next we consider individual behavior for the row subjects who are at the centre of our attention
(because the form of the feedback was varied only for Row players). Our objective is to see whether
we can identify di⁄erent types of subjects, where types are de￿ned by their ￿typical￿best response
behavior. Subjects who "typically" (to be de￿ned later) best respond to Fine and Coarse beliefs shall
be called ￿Nash￿players and ￿ABEE￿players, respectively. Row players who typically best respond
to the uniform beliefs over the 60 rounds will be called ￿Level 1￿players. Finally, we add a fourth
type where we cannot say that any of the beliefs are followed. This type we call ￿Level 0￿ , with the
assumption that this subject uses none of the information provided in choosing which row to click
on.11 The di⁄erence with Subsection 4.1 is that we follow each individual Row player across all 60
rounds, and we ask ourselves whether his use of feedback is consistent with either the Fine, the Coarse
or the Uniform belief throughout the duration of the experiment.
The use of the word ￿typical￿in the above paragraph might sound ambiguous but in what follows
we shall explain precisely our procedures. The key idea is that for each type of belief we calculate a
variable that indicates the realized gains or losses from the actual choice against the hypothetical best
response. More speci￿cally, when a player does not best respond to a particular belief this variable is
equal to the di⁄erence between the expected pro￿t from taking the optimal choice, minus that of the
choice taken. (This is the expected loss that we have also used above in the analysis of the aggregate
data.) When a player does best respond the variable is set equal to the di⁄erence between the second
best choice and the best that he chose, which is thus negative. (One might refer to this as the avoided
expected loss.) Thus, the variable is positive when subjects do not best respond, and negative when
they do. Let￿ s call this variable the subject￿ s incentive with respect to a particular belief. IF, IC and
IU give the incentives with respect to Fine, Coarse and Uniform beliefs respectively. For each subject
we, thus, have a sequence of 59 values (one for each round other than round 1) for both IF and IC.
If a player typically best responds to a given belief, then we can expect two things. First, the
median of the observed incentives will be negative. This is straightforward ￿ we are just saying
that the player best responds more often than not and thus that there are more negative values than
positive.12 The second aspect is slightly more subtle. In line with standard models of noisy decision
making we should expect that subjects who in principle want to follow a particular best response mode,
but are prone to mistakes, would more often deviate if the incentives were small than if they were
large. Hence, for a player who ￿typically￿best responds against a certain belief we should expect the
observed distribution of incentives to be skewed towards lager negative and smaller positive values.13
11This is justi￿ed as in almost all rounds the choices made by the ￿rst 3 types span the strategy set for row players.
12As we are proceeding with a hypothesis testing method, what we really want to de￿ne is what we wouldn￿ t see
if the player was not using these incentives. The uniform strategy is such a strategy and here we would expect that
each row would be chosen with a probability of one third, which would lead to a strictly postive expected median.
However, we also have to exclude the possibility that any two of the strategies are mixed. In using the relatively
weaker (more di¢ cult to reject) null hypothesis of a median of 0, which implies that this strategy be chosen with an
empirical probability of greater than one half, we aim to ask whether or not this incentive is used, rather than whether
any incentive is used.
13We are slightly mis-using the concept of the skew of a sample in considering the relative sizes of samples on each
side of the median, rather than the mean, as is more conventional. However, this interpretation is consistent with our
test procedure, and all mention of the ￿ skew￿of a distribution should be interpreted as using the median, rather than
14Following this line of reasoning we de￿ne the following null hypotheses:
1. Median(I) ￿ 0 and
2. If Median(I) = 0 then Skew(I) ￿ 0
For each method of forming beliefs, we have di⁄erent bounds for the incentives and di⁄erent
distributions under both the null hypothesis, and under the di⁄erent equilibrium outcomes. We
therefore require a test or tests for our null hypotheses that are invariant to the scale and the particular
shape of the distribution of the incentives, apart from the median and the skewness. The ￿rst part
is easily tested using the sign test, which employs a simple binomial test on the number of positive
and negative values. Gibbons (2003) suggests that the Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank-sum test can be
used as a test for distributional symmetry (assuming a known median).14 We proceed by using the
sign test to try to reject the hypothesis that the player best responds on average less than half of the
time. If we are able to reject this hypothesis, then we allocate the player to the corresponding type.15
If we are unable to reject the null, then we test for the positive skewness in the distribution, while
assuming that the median is zero. If we are able to reject this hypothesis then again we allocate the
player to the appropriate type.
The Wilcoxon test proceeds by ordering the observed incentives by absolute magnitude, ignoring
the sign. The smallest incentive (perhaps 0) would then be given a rank of 1 continuing to the largest
incentive, which is given the rank of 59. Then the ranks corresponding to positive incentives are
summed and normalised using Wilcoxon￿ s formulae to give a test statistic which is asymptotically
normal with mean 0 and variance 1. We use a one sided test against the Normal distribution at
our signi￿cance level to test our null hypothesis. It is important to note here that the test statistic
is increasing in the median (i.e. the number of positive incentive values) and the skew (i.e. the
relative magnitude of the postive incentive values compared to the negative values). Hence if we can
reject the hypothesis that both the median and the skew are 0, we can also reject that they are both
non-negative.
For each of the methods of forming beliefs, we test our hypothesis against the corresponding
incentives using the combination of the sign and Wilcoxon tests described with a signi￿cance level of
5%. If a null hypothesis is rejected, then we consider that the player is close to following the incentives,
and is likely to have formed beliefs of opponents play using the corresponding method. If none of the
null hypotheses are rejected then we allocate that player to the ￿Level 0￿type as we are unable to
say that any of the incentives are followed. In essence, we are allocating players to a type only if we
can reject that their incentive values could be generated by a player who doesn￿ t use them to make
decisions. This may seem to be a test of relatively low strength, and it may seem likely that there
the mean as the location measure in it￿ s calculation.
14In fact, the Wilcoxon test can also be used as a test of Location (when assuming a symmetric distribution). This
would open up the possibility of combining both parts of the test by using just the Wilcoxon test. However, we are
reluctant to follow this path as it is not clear how the skew and location e⁄ects are compensated in the test. This
would make the results ambiguous if the skew and median of a sequence of incentives had di⁄erent signs. Also, we
speci￿cally want to ignore the e⁄ect of the skewness if the player best responds most of the time.
15It would not be possible to allocate a player to more than one type here, unless the best responses coincided very
often, as they would need to best respond more than half the time to be able to reject the null.
15Type Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
Nash player 12 14 3 3
ABEE player 1 1 7 12
Level 1 player 1 0 0 1
Level 0 player 2 1 6 0
Table 3: Type allocation over all rounds
would be high numbers of Level 0 players, but this can only work in favour of any postive results. We
are relatively cautious about putting players into the Nash, ABEE and Level 1 types, so we can be
relatively con￿dent of these allocations. Finally, we are presented with a problem if more than one of
our null hypotheses are rejected at each stage. Thankfully, this happens in only two cases out of all
64 row players￿ in one particular session in the CoarseAccess treatment where the best responses
to the Fine and Coarse feedback coincided often. For these two cases, we allocated the subjects to
the type where the incentive gave the lowest p-value in our test (one was allocated to the Nash and
one to the ABEE type). Similarly, only three type allocations were changed by the test of skewness.
The results are detailed in table 3.
In Fine and FineAccess the vast majority of subjects can indeed be classi￿ed as Nash players.
In Coarse and CoarseAccess the majorities are smaller but the most frequent type is indeed the
ABEE player. We also observe that the CoarseAccess treatment has the greatest number of subjects
who were classi￿ed as Level 0. There are a number of possible reasons for this. It seems that the
increased complexity of the feedback means that subjects experiment more in their strategies and are
thus harder to categorize.16
Another reason for the di¢ culty in identifying types in the CoarseAccess treatment is that a
player￿ s type might not be constant throughout the experiment. Perhaps some of the players who
start out ignoring the less accessible feedback are able to interpret it later on in the session. Or
perhaps some players are confused about how to interpret the information at all, and require a few
rounds to understand how to use the available information to make decisions. Our previous method
of distinguishing types takes no notice of the dynamics, so we were unable to detect this. In our
￿nal test, we consider the possibility of such learning during the experiment, and that each player￿ s
method of forming beliefs (as well as the information contained in those beliefs) might change during
the experiment. We split the experiment into four phases of 15 rounds each and we repeat the same
tests using the sign and Wilcoxon tests, with the same 5% signi￿cance level for each stage of the
experiment and each row player. The results are given in table 4.
Initially, we ￿nd a huge share of Level 0 types but after the ￿rst quarter of the experiment there
is a huge jump in sophistication. From the second quarter onwards most subjects are either Nash or
ABEE players and then remain so for the rest of the experiment. This gives further weight to the idea
that players learn during the experiment both in terms of the information revealed about opponents
play, but also in terms of how to interpret that information. However, it seems that, once subjects
16Incidentally, this leads to column players changing their strategies such that the best responses to the ￿ne and
coarse feedbacks coincide for the row players. Therefore, there are less rounds where the strategies can be distinguished
which makes it even more di¢ cult to reject the null.
16Rounds 1 to 15
Type Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
Nash player 9 9 1 1
ABEE player 1 0 3 4
Level 1 player 0 0 0 0
Level 0 player 6 7 12 11
Rounds 16 to 30
Type Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
Nash player 12 12 3 2
ABEE player 0 0 5 7
Level 1 player 1 0 0 1
Level 0 player 3 4 8 6
Rounds 31 to 45
Type Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
Nash player 12 13 3 2
ABEE player 1 0 8 10
Level 1 player 0 0 0 1
Level 0 player 3 3 5 3
Rounds 46 to 60
Type Fine FineAccess CoarseAccess Coarse
Nash player 12 12 3 1
ABEE player 2 0 9 13
Level 1 player 0 0 0 1
Level 0 player 2 4 4 1
Table 4: Type allocation over di⁄erent phases
17have settled on a way of accessing and interpreting the given information, they rarely change this
interpretation later in the experiment. Once they have found a method of forming beliefs, their type
is largely ￿xed. We note that the latter ￿nding goes against the view (at least in the present context)
that subjects process information in a ￿ner way as more experience accumulates.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown conclusive evidence for the role of accessibility of information in decision
making. When information is presented in a complex manner it would be very naive to assume that
subjects can process it with full accuracy. Our experiments con￿rm this very intuitive statement. But
our study also shows that accessibility (or more generally, framing) issues can be modelled￿ and in
quite familiar ways. Thus, acknowledging the role of framing e⁄ects does not imply giving up the
apparatus of game theoretic modeling and equilibrium analysis.
More speci￿cally, we ￿nd that when we uncouple quantitative information about choice frequencies
from information about in which context these choices were made subjects do what appears to be very
natural: They bundle the frequency information, irrespective of context. This is very similar to the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium approach as considered in Jehiel (2005). The logic behind this
is surely that subjects are hesitant to throw away what is obviously useful information and decide,
in face of its complexity, to simplify its content. They may or may not know how this distorts their
actions from the optimal choice. Unconstrained optimization is simply not an issue for them￿ when
the presentation gets too di¢ cult they simply cannot process it correctly. Of course, for some this
may not be surprising. The more important aspect of our result is, therefore, that subjects do process
the information nevertheless and in a systematic way.
From the viewpoint of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium approach, our study is suggestive
that the analogy partitions considered in that approach should not necessarily be viewed as deriving
solely from the characteristics of the interaction. Here, with an identical underlying interaction, we
were able to generate di⁄erent grouping simply by playing with the accessibility of the feedback given
to subjects. Thus, our approach suggests to include as part of the description of the interaction the
type of feedback given to subjects and how accessible it is. That is, it suggests including the analogy
partitions used by the players as part of the description of the environment.
From a broader perspective, it seems legitimate to say that in the real world, we are faced with
myriads of information, and one could even argue that information is more and more symmetrically
shared as permitted by the internet technology. Yet, this view misses the point that the processing
of information is not free of cost as usually assumed in economic theory. In order to make use of the
information one has to simplify it. That is, one has to throw away many of the dimensions of the
real world problem in order to identify regularities17 and eventually reach a decision. Our experiment
shows that the information processing of agents is likely to a⁄ect the behaviors of the agents even
after these behaviors have stabilized (i.e., after one has reached an equilibrium). It is thus of primary
17As recently shown by Aragones et al. (2005), this is a hard problem in a computer science sense.
18importance to understand how agents process information by focussing on some aspects of the data
rather than others in order to inform theorists which behaviors should be considered as stable and in
which contexts.18 We view this experiment as a preliminary step toward this end.19
A Experiment Instructions
There follows the instruction sheets handed out at the start of the experiment. Step-by-step in-
structions were presented on the computer screen at the start of each session, and these sheets were
intended to be used as a reference during the experiment. They have all been amended to show the
name of the treatment they apply to, but are otherwise identical to those handed out.
18The identi￿cation of equilibria (or stable behaviors) is also necessary for the understanding of incentives in given
environments, which is required to design well performing institutions.
19The views that theories are simpli￿cations of the world and that experiments may help design better theories agree
with the recent paper by Samuelson (2005).
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